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CONFLICTS: CONCURRENT
LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION IN
DETERMINING TORT LIABILITY
RICHARD V. CARPENTER*
INTRODUCTION
In the past thirty years a few Supreme Court decisions have wrought
a revolution in the theory of legislative jurisdiction applicable to work-
men's compensation cases. Justice Brandeis writing for the majority
in Bradford Electric Co. v. Clapper' held that the full faith and credit
clause of the constitution compelled a court to give effect to the com-
pensation law of the state of principal employment and to deny the
common law tort remedy under the law of the state of injury, which
also happened to be.the forum. The first state, according to the Bran-
deis view, had exclusive legislative jurisdiction to define the jural rela-
tions between employer and employee. Justice Stone concurred in the
result of this case but on the basis of judicial discretion and not of con-
stitutional compulsion. Subsequently Stone wrote court opinions in
which he developed the theory that in workmen's compensation cases
with multiple, state contacts, the court should weigh and appraise the
governmental interest of each state involved and should apply the
remedy provided by that state with the most substantial interest in the
matter and best suited, at the time and place of trial, to effect a just
result.2 Later Justice Stone, writing for the court, reached the con-
clusion that in compensation cases with multiple state contacts, each
interested state could properly apply its own remedy in the matter with-
out compulsionto regard the interest or law of any other state or states.
The injured workman or his family may freely elect the remedy which
they choose to pursue and then pursue it in the appropriate forum.'
Justice Douglas has gone even further. He dissented in Magnolia Pe-
troleum on the ground that the injured workman should not be pre-
cluded from seeking supplemental remedy in Louisiana (the place of
employment) merely because he had first sought and received his rem-
* Professor of Law. Loyola University, Chicago, Illinois.
1286 U.S. 145 (1932).
2 Alaska Packers Association v. Industrial Accident Commission of California,
294 U.S. 532 (1935); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Com-
mission, 306 U.S. 493 (1939).
3 Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430 (1943).
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edy in Texas (the place of injury) which the Texas statute purported
to make exclusive. Finally Justice Douglas, writing the court's opinion
in Carroll v. Lanza,4 comes close to making his Magnolia dissent the law
of the land although he does find some factual differences between the
cases on which he purports to distinguish the two results. In any event
the law today clearly recognizes the possibility of concurrent jurisdiction
in two or more states at the same time to prescribe conflicting rights,
duties, procedures and remedies incident to an industrial accident.
Now, we believe, a slower-moving revolution is at work in the field
of conflict of tort laws, away from the search for some single state
with exclusive jurisdiction to determine rights and liabilities, and
toward the recognition of multiple concurrent jurisdictions to legislate
concerning the same particular tortious action. For illustration let us
consider the hypothetical case of Lovelace v. Wolf, first from the view
of traditional American theories and then in the light of newer insights.
LOVELACE V. WOLF
Walter Wolf and Lucy Lovelace are school teachers in State X
where they were born and bred. One summer they journeyed to New
York City in pursuit of academic credits toward master's degrees in
education. There Walter professed increasing admiration and finally
love for Lucy and their relationship burgeoned into a torrid romance.
Unhappily by the time they returned to State X at the end of the
summer, Walter's ardor had been diverted to other objectives and Lucy
was left forlorn.
State X's law and policy relevant to such a situation reflect a chival-
rous culture trustful and solicitous with respect to maiden innocence
and suspicious and severe with respect to the predatory guile of men.
Such is the virtue and decorum of social life in State X that few seduc-
tion suits have ever been filed. The decisions, however, have established
a firm and liberal policy for redressing the wrongs of a maiden such as
Lucy who has surrendered herself to a paramour induced by his false
promise of marriage or by his fraudulent protestations of true love.
New York, on the other hand, has long been case hardened by multi-
plicity of guileful women who prey upon concupiscent but sometimes
relatively guileless males. The state is cynical with respect to the inno-
cence of maidens who litigate their sins in hope of financial gain. Its
legislature has therefore abolished the common law right of action to
recover money damages for seduction. 5 Seduction, however, still re-
mains a punishable offense under New York Penal Law section 2175.
TRADITIONAL AMERICAN THEORIES
If under the foregoing circumstances Lucy should feel goaded to
4349 U.S. 408 (1955).
5N. Y. Civil Practice Act. §61-b.
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sue Walter in State X for damages suffered by reason of her seduction
in New York, she would probably lose her case under traditional Amer-
ican theories governing the choice of laws. New York was clearly the
place of wrong in the accepted sense.6 Two rules which have been
deemed elementary in the American law of conflicts are: (1) the law
of the place of wrong determines whether a person has sustained a legal
injury ;7 and (2) if no cause of action is created at the place of wrong
no recovery can be had in any other state." To put it another way, the
place where a party has suffered an injury will have exclusive legislative
jurisdiction to determine the nature and extent of any legal rights which
he may have by reason of the injury.9
This American orthodoxy strove for an ideal uniformity of decision
-tied in with so-called "vested rights" theory-so that all forums, re-
gardless of variances in their domestic laws and regardless of multiple
state contacts, would attach the same legal consequences to a given set
of operative facts. It sought to prescribe unique contacts in each case
which would give one territory rather than any other the exclusive
jurisdiction to define authoritatively the ultimate legal consequences of
the respective operative facts. The rights thus defined by a state found
to have exclusive jurisdiction were said to be vested and entitled to
recognition and enforcement by all other states. If no rights were
granted by such state, then no rights could be granted or enforced by
any other state.
Rigid adherence to these theories has occasionally led to wierd results
-for example, those two well known case book decisions, Slater v. Mexi-
can National Railroad Co.'0 and Scheer v. Rockne Motors Corpora-
tion." In Slater a Texas widow and her children sued in a Federal
district court in Texas for damages for the death of her husband caused
by the negligence of his employer. The deceased had been a Texan and
and defendant employer was a Colorado corporation operating a rail-
way from Texas to Mexico City. The accidental death occurred across
the international boundary in Mexico. Both Texas and Mexican laws
provided a remedy under the circumstances for the bereft family of the
6 RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT oF LAWS §377 (1934).
7Id. §378.8 Id. §384.
9 To the direct contrary is the "local law" rule established in England since
Machado v. Fontes, 2 Q.B. 231 (1897). The court there applied English libel
law to permit plaintiff to recover damages for publication in Brazil of a Portu-
guese language pamphlet although Brazil would have allowed no recovery.
The court stressed, however, that the publication was "wrongful" even in Brazil
for the law of that country recognized such a publication as a criminal of-
fense. Thus, incidentally, the ruling would squarely support Lucy's case against
Walter.
10 194 U.S. 120 (1904). Accord, Carter v. Tillery, 257 S.W. 2d 465 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1953). See sharp criticism by G. W .Stumberg, Place of Wrong: Torts
and the Conflict of Laws, 34 WAsH. L. REv. 388 (1959).
1168 F. 2d 942 (2d Cir. 1934).
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deceased. The Mexican remedy, however, was of an indefinite continu-
ing type subject to change or termination with changing family circum-
stances-not dissimilar in principle to our alimony support decrees. The
lower court found the defendant liable by orthodox application of Mex-
ican law but then sought to convert the open-end Mexican remedy into
a lump sum judgment similar to the Texan remedy. The Supreme
Court upheld the Court of Appeals in reversing the judgment and dis-
missing the case. Justice Holmes in the court's opinion said :12
The theory of the foreign suit is that although the act com-
plained of was subject to no law having force in the forum, it
gave rise to an obligation, an obligatio, which, like other obliga-
tions, follows the person, and may be enforced wherever the
person may be found.... But as the only source of this obliga-
tion is the law of the place of the act, it follows that that law de-
termines not merely the existence of the obligation . . . but
equally determines its extent. It seems to us unjust to allow a
plaintiff to come here absolutely depending on the foreign law
for the foundation of his case, and yet to deny the defendant the
benefit of whatever limitations on his liability that law would
impose.
After this logical demonstration that the forum could apply no rem-
edy except that precisely prescribed by Mexican law, Justice Holmes
further concluded that no Federal court had the power to make a decree
of the kind contemplated by the Mexican statutes.' 3 The widow and
orphans were thus left without any remedy at all. -Holmes has elsewhere
criticized undue reliance on logic in the judicial process. His Slater
rationale well illustrates that it is not logic (when formally correct)
which causes bad decisions but rather the rigidity of questionable prem-
ises-in that instance the doctrine that the place of wrong has exclusive
legislative jurisdiction.
The Scheer case involved the vicarious liability of a car owner for
the negligent driving of his salesman bailee. The defendant had fur-
nished a car to his Buffalo salesman whose territory was New York
and Pennsylvania. On a trip into Ontario the salesman's reckless driv-
ing seriously injured his guest passenger, the plaintiff. The plaintiff
originally recovered $40,000 judgment but the Court of Appeals re-
versed and ordered a new trial on the ground that the plaintiff must
slhow that the salesman was acting within the scope of his authority
when he drove the car into. Canada. It was conceded that the Ontario
law by its terms would impose liability on the New York owner by
reason of the fact that he had given possession of the car to the negli-
gent driver, regardless of whether the driver had gone beyond his
authorized territory. The New York statute also would have imposed
12 194 U.S. 120, 126 (1904).
13 Id. at 128.
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liability on the car owner if the accident had occurred in New York.
But Judge Learned Hand reached his decision by a rigid adherence to
the doctrine of exclusive legislative jurisdiction.14
The wrongful act here in question took place in Ontario; it
was Clemens's driving; Ontario might of course make him liable.
But in imputing his liability to the defendant that law had to
reach beyond its borders, for the only acts by which the defendant
connected itself with him were in New York .... It is clear that
the defendant did not give him authority to go to Canada merely
by giving him the car. Unless more than that was shown, the
law of Ontario could not reach the defendant; the charge gave it
extra-territorial effect, as much as though that province had pre-
tended to fix liability on Clemens for injuries suffered in New
York. As this went to the very heart of the case as it was pre-
sented to the jury, the judgment must be reversed.
It is surprising that Learned Hand of all judges should thus regard
the foreign rule of law as exclusively applicable to the case, because
Hand is commonly credited with being one of the first Americans to
formulate the so-called "local law" theory of which we will speak later.
In fact in this same Scheer opinion Hand expressed that theory :1'
We must remember that the question is never of enforcing
a liability arising in another state; no court can do that but one
of the state where it arose; in the case at bar this is acutely evi-
dent because the defendant was never there, and could fall under
no liability until it went there. A liability implies a sanction, and
a sanction a person to coerce. The sole question, here as always,
is. how far the court of the forum will adopt the law of another
place as the standard for its own legal consequences.
in Hand's application the local court seems as restricted by the
foreign rule of law and legislative jurisdiction as Holmes would have
it bound and limited by the foreign "obligatio" or vested right. It is
difficult to discover much difference between -the two. The car bailment
occurred in New York and the accident in Ontario. If both events had
occurred in the, same jurisdiction, New York or Ontario, the law of
either jurisdiction would have held the defendant liable. The decision,
however, made the defendant's immunity turn on a circumstance which
by any. funictional approach would seem irrelevant--viz. that the acci-
dent occurred across the boundary in Ontario rather than in New York.
This refusal to apply either -Ontario or New York law of liability sim-
ply because the events were territorially separate seems highly unrealis-
tic and succeeded only in frustrating the apparent policy of both juris-
dictions. In fact both the Slater and Scheer decisions resemble macabre
4 Supra note 11, at 943.ISId. at 944. Professor D. F. Cavers -has noted the anomaly or ambiguity in
Judge Hand's theory and concludes that instead of a "local law" theory it
should be known as the "homologous right" theory-not much dissimilar from
Holmes' "obligatio" idea. Cavers, Two "Local Law" Theories, 63 HAmv. L.
REv. 822 (1950).
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perversions of Solomon's famous judgment in that they have split the
baby in half because the forum-jurisdiction in each case would neither
enforce its own maternal claim by departing from the place of wrong
rule nor enforce the rights granted by the other jurisdiction.
More recently, in 1956 the Court of Appeals in the second circuit
reaffirmed the traditional American dogma applicable to conflicts in tort
law. But Judge Frank, writing the court's opinion, himself questions
the result. Defendant was a Delaware corporation doing business in
New York as well as in Saudi Arabia. There its truck hit and seriously
injured the plaintiff who was a resident citizen of Arkansas. Plaintiff
filed his suit for damages in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York. The court gave judgment against the
plaintiff on the orthodox ground that Saudi Arabian law must apply to
the alleged tort and plaintiff had offered no proof of Arabian law or the
absence of it. Judge Frank adverted to criticism of this rigid "place of
wrong" doctrine in the following footnote comment:
Were this not a diversity case, it might perhaps be appropri-
ate to suggest that the Supreme Court should reconsider the
accepted doctrine (as to complete dominance of the 'law' of the
place where the alleged tort occurred) which seems to have been
unduly influenced by notions of sovereignty a la Hobbes. 16
TRADITIONAL ESCAPES FROM PLACE-OF-WRONG RULE
American courts have not infrequently escaped the consequences of
the rigid place-of-wrong rule when such consequences were not to judi-
cial liking, either by invoking local public policy to defeat a foreign
cause of action or by adroit characterization of the legal question in
issue as one other than substantive tort law. Examples of the latter
have occurred most frequently where courts have characterized ques-
tions such as burden of proof, evidentiary presumptions, statutes of
limitation, measure of damages and the like, as procedural questions
governed by the law of the forum rather than the place-of-wrong.1
7
Some courts have used the characterization device with surprising free-
dom and variety to reach some preferred result. One may suspect an
occasional procrustean tendency to fit an issue into a category tradi-
tionally governed by the state whose rule of law is the one the court
wants to apply. Thus in another case-book favorite, Levy v. Daniels'
U-Drive Auto Renting Company,'8 the court held the Connecticut car-
16Walton v. Arabian American Oil Co., 233 F. 2d 541, n. 4 (2d Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 872 (1956).
17 E.g., Levy v. Steiger, 233 Mass. 600, 124 N.E. 477 (1919) ; Jones v. Chicago,
St. P., M. & 0. Ry. Co., 80 Minn 488, 83 N.W. 446 (1900); Herzog v. Stern,
264 N.Y. 379, 191 N.E. 23 (1934). In one well-known case an Alabama court
went so far as to enjoin the prosecution in Georgia of a tort action arising in
Alabama lest the Georgia court characterize Alabama's rule of presumption
as merely procedural and thereby escape its effect. Weaver v. Alabama Great
Southern R. Co. 200 Ala. 432, 76 So. 364 (1917).28 108 Conn. 333, 143 Atl. 163 (1928).
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bailor liable under Connecticut law for injuries inflicted by its bailee in
Massachusetts on the quixotic theory that the plaintiff's action lay in
contract rather than tort. The court deemed the Massachusetts plaintiff
to be a third party beneficiary of the Connecticut contract of bailment.
The court might have justified the result reached in the case much more
simply by characterizing the Connecticut statute as admonitory and
therefore subject to Connecticut police power (as hereinafter dis-
cussed), rather than by applying any tort or distorted contract theory.
MODERN DEVELOPMENTS
Some American legal writerso and, more recently, a few of our
courts have displayed considerable independence in criticizing the rigid-
ity of old concepts of jurisdiction. They move away from the idea of a
single territorial sovereignty having exclusive legislative jurisdiction
and focus on a more realistic appraisal of the competing interests and
policies of the jurisdictions involved. The change may perhaps be re-
flected in the contrasting treatment of legislative jurisdiction contained,
respectively, in section 42 of the 1934 Restatement of the Law of Con-
flicts and in section 42 of the 1956 Tentative Draft of the Restatement.
The former defines jurisdiction to be the power of a state to create in-
terests which under the principles of the common law will be recognized
in other states. The restrictive effect of these "principles of common
law" applied to tort jurisdiction is indicated by sections 377 and 378 of
the 1934 Restatement which we have discussed above.20 The Tentative
Draft, on the other hand, avoids reference to common law and says that
a state has legislative jurisdiction whenever its contacts with a person,
thing, or occurrence are sufficient to make it reasonable to apply that
state's law to create or affect legal interests. The central core of jurisdic-
tion is stated to be reasonableness and more than one state may at the
same time have legislative jurisdiction in a given situation. Up to this
writing the American Law Institute has not published any proposed re-
vision of sections 377 and 378 of the 1934 Restatement mentioned
above, but it would surprise and disappoint us if those sections, as fi-
nally revised, should attempt to cram the broad standard of reasonable-
ness into the narrow vise of the old place-of-wrong rule.
The multiple legislative jurisdictions contemplated by the Tentative
Draft is compatible with a "local-law" theory of judicial process in de-
ciding a case involving foreign elements. According to such a theory a
court may and should in a proper case tailor its local law on a pattern
showing foreign design but the decision is still said to be local law. It
may seem like tweedledee v. tweedledum to split hairs over whether a
court is applying foreign law or is applying local law patterned after
-9 The earliest was Walter W. Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict
of Laws, 33 YALE L. J. 457 (1924).
20 See supra notes 7 and 8.
1961]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
foreign law. The distinction, however, would contribute to at least one
important practical result. Once the court assumes it is applying local
law it may be expected normally to exercise much greater independence
in adopting, rejecting or modifying foreign rules of law.2' Legislative
jurisdiction is no longer the exclusive monopoly of one state and foreign
law loses its compulsive force. When a court is called upon to choose
between conflicting rules of law of two or more jurisdictions (whether
or not one of those jurisdictions be its own state) its power, strictly
speaking, is limited only by full faith and credit and by due process,
whose strictures, incidentally, have had a tendency to loosen in the
field of conflict of laws.2 2 It goes without saying, of course, that a good
court should properly seek a good result by weighing and balancing the
respective interests of the states involved and evaluating their policies.
Inescapably such evaluation will be made in the light of the standards
of reasonableness, fair play and justice personally accepted by the indi-
vidual judges, as affected by the usages, traditions and policies of the
court's own state or jurisdiction. In any event it is the forum-court
which will determine the extent, if any, to which a foreign legislative
jurisdiction will be permitted to affect the court's own local law making.
Gordon v. Parker23 well illustrates the new approach. Here a Pennsyl-
vania husband sued in Massachusetts for alienation of affections based
on acts of adultery committed in Massachusetts by the Massachusetts
defendant and plaintiff's wife. Pennsylvania had abolished all civil
causes of action for alienation of affection but the action would lie so
far as Massachusetts domestic law was concerned. The court applied
Massachusetts law in deciding in favor of the plaintiff but it did so on
no stereotyped place-of-wrong approach. Judge Wyzanski had this to
say :31
This is not a situation in which the interests of Pennsylvania
plainly outweigh those of Massachusetts. The social order of each
is implicated. As the place of matrimonial domicil, Pennsylvania
has an interest in whether conduct in any part of the world is
held to affect adversely the marriage relationship between its
domiciliaries. But, as the place where the alleged misconduct oc-
curred and as the place where the alleged wrongdoer lives, Mass-
achusetts also has an interest. She is concerned with conduct
within her borders which in her view lowers the standards of the
community where they occur. She is also concerned when her
citizens intermeddle with other people's marriages. But admit-
tedly she has little interest in the degree of affection one Pennsyl-
vanian spouse has for another....
22 Judge Hand to the contrary. See supra note 15.
22 Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954) ; Clay v
Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., 363 U.S. 207 (1960); Wells v. Simonds Abrasive
Company, 345 U.S. 514 (1953).
2383 F. Supp. 40 (D. Mass. 1949).231 Id. at 40-42.
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If the choice between Pennsylvania's interests and Massachu-
setts' interests presented in the case at bar were laid before a
Massachusetts court, it seems to me probable that it would strike
a balance in favor of its own Commonwealth.
This decision is one we would expect on either traditional or modem
grounds. The notable feature of the opinion is the modern rationale
which, we believe, would have led to the same result in favor of the plain-
tiff even though we were to transpose the facts by making M-assachusetts
the residence of all parties and Pennsylvania the place of misconduct.
Here the court's concern in serving Massachusetts' interest in protecting
the marriage relationship and in compensating the injured husband would
presumably have outweighed Pennsylvania's disinterest in allowing
civil claims for local acts of adultery. Doubt would arise under the
transposed facts, we believe, only where the defendant was himself
a resident in Pennsylvania who happened to be caught in Massachusetts
for service of process during some incidental stop-over in that state.
Under such circumstances the court might agree with Judge Learned
Hand in doubting the legislative jurisdiction of Massachusetts to impose
liability for Pennsylvania acts of adultery on a Pennsylvanian who was
"neither physically present within its boundaries, nor resident there,
nor bound to it by allegiance.
'24
Other decisions representing the new viewpoint may be divided into
three principal groups, according to subject matter: (a) survivorship of
actions, (b) intra-family liability and (c) admonitory legislation.
(a) Survivorship of Actions
The common law rule relating to survivorship is to the effect that a
tort claim does not survive the death of the tort feasor but abates upon
his death. The rule is due to the original view of tort liability as an ex-
tension of criminal or penal liability. Since death abates the liability of
a criminal or penal defendant, medieval jurists assumed that claims
against a tort feasor should likewise be extinguished by his death. The
rule utterly disregards the compensatory nature of tort damages and
shows no concern for the continuing injuries and urgent needs of the
surviving victims. Traditionally the rule has been regarded as one of
extinguishment affecting the substance and viability of the tort claim.
In a case of conflict where an injury has occurred in one state which
has abolished the archaic rule and recovery is sought against the tort
feasor's estate in a second state which retains the rule, the second state
has on occasion refused to enforce the cause of action on the ground
of its own public policy.25 Such refusal would not constitute a decision
2 Siegmann v. Meyer, 100 F. 2d 367, 368 (2d Cir. 1939). Also see supra note 14.25 Herzog v. Stern, 264 N.Y. 379, 191 N.E. 23 (1934) ; Gray v. Blight, 112 F. 2d
696 (10th Cir. 1940).
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on the merits. The reverse, however, did not hold, namely if the injury
had occurred in the second state whose law extinguished the claim, the
claim has traditionally been regarded as extinguished everywhere. It is
the old principle which permits forum policy sometimes to serve as a
shield but never as a sword.26 But this accepted state of affairs was un-
settled in 1953 by the California Supreme Court's decision in Grant v.
McAuliffe.
Grant v. McAuliffe involved an Arizona collision between two cars
from California in which both drivers and all passengers were Califor-
nia residents. Pullen, the driver alleged to have been responsible for
the accident, died as a result of injuries received and the other injured
parties filed claims against his estate in California for money damages.
Arizona at the time (unlike California) still clung to the archaic rule
of survivorship and the trial court applied that rule to dismiss the
claims. On appeal the Supreme Court of California reversed. Judge
Traynor, speaking for the court, asserted that the precedents were in-
conclusive and proceeded to characterize survivorship as a procedural
question governed by the law of the forum. Thus:
We have concluded that survival of causes of action should
be governed by the law of the forum. Survival is not an essen-
tial part of the cause of action itself but relates to the procedures
available for the enforcement of the legal claim for damages.
Basically the question is one of the administration of decedents'
estates, which is a purely local proceeding.... Decedent's estate
is located in this state, and letters of administration were issued
to defendant by the courts of this state. The responsibilities of
defendant, as administrator of Pullen's estate, for injuries in-
flicted by Pullen before his death are governed by the laws of
this state .... Today, tort liabilities of the sort involved in these
actions are regarded as compensatory. When, as in the present
case, all of the parties were residents of this state, and the estate
of deceased tort feasor is being administered in this state, plain-
tiffs' right to prosecute their causes of action is governed by the
laws of this state relating to administration of estates. ...
Critics were quick to attack the decision for its unorthodox result
and for Traynor's highly suspect analysis of the precedents.2 8 The best
and most thorough going comment and criticism of the decision was
made by Brainerd Currie who concurred enthusiastically with its result
but agreed with its critics that it violated all precedents. At the end of
a scholarly appendix in which he reviews the cases he concludes :29
The decision of the California Supreme Court in Grant v.
26 Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
2741 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P. 2d 944, 949 (1953).
28 Sumner, Choice of Law Governing Survival of Actions, 9 HASTINGS L. J. 128
(1958).
29 Currie, Survival of Actions: Adjudication v. Automation in the Conflict of
Laws, 10 STAN. L. REV. 205, 252 (1958).
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McAuliffe was, indeed, unorthodox; the cases exactly in point
are to the contrary. But the question is whether the court is to be
condemned for preferring rationality to orthodoxy.
It is interesting to note that in 1959, six years after his Grant deci-
sion, Judge Traynor had occasion to refer to Professor Currie's article
as one of a series "that brilliantly set forth an affirmative new approach
to conflict of laws."30 He then offered the following critique of his own
opinion in the Grant case :31
Although the opinion in the case is my own, I do not regard
it as ideally articulated, developed as it had to be against the
brooding background of a petrified forest. Yet I would make no
more apology for it than that in reaching a rational result it was
less deft than it might have been to quit itself of the familiar
speech of choice of law.
At the same time he rationalizes his decision anew, this time weigh-
ing claims and interests of the parties and jurisdictions involved:
California policy views damages for personal injuries as com-
pensatory and the survival statute implements that policy by
subordinating the interests of the decedent's heirs, legatees, de-
visees and creditors to the interests of the injured person. Cali-
fornia contacts were more than sufficient to give the state an
interest in applying its policy. Not only were the parties residents
of California but the decedent's estate was being administered in
California. The court parted company with the Restatement by
expressly rejecting the law of the place-of-wrong. It applied Cal-
ifornia law and allowed recovery. Had it mechanically invoked
the law of the place of wrong, it would have made an exception
to the local law, defeating a legitimate interest of the forum state
without serving the interest of any other state. Even though
Arizona had a policy giving preference over injured claimants to
heirs, legatees, devisees and creditors of an estate, there was no
indication that it had any contact with the case other than the
fortuitous occurrence of the accident in Arizona, hardly suffi-
cient to give it an interest in the application of its policy....
(b) Intra-family Immunity
In the meanwhile, in 1955, Judge Traynor wrote the opinion in an-
other pathfinding decision, Emery v. Emery.32 Here two small girls sued
their father at their family domicile in California for injuries suffered
in Idaho while riding in the family car. The court considered the thres-
hold questions of how the plaintiffs' claim might be affected by their
status, first as guest riders and second as minor children of the defend-
ant. On the first point the court remained orthodox and referred to
Idaho law which allows claims of guest riders where "reckless disre-
gard of the rights of others" is charged or imputed to the defendant as
30 Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TEXAs L. Rav. 655, 667 (1959).
31 Id. at 670, n. 35.
3245 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P. 2d 218, 223 (1955).
1961]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
was here the case. On the point of intra-family immunity the court
discussed three possible choices of law, viz.: "the law of the place where
the injury occurred, the law of the forum, and the law of the state in
which the family is domiciled". Judge Traynor dismissed the first
choice with the words that it was "not a question of tort but one of
capacity to sue and be sued and as to that question the place of injury is
both fortuitous and irrelevant." Under the actual facts the forum and
domicile were one and the same but Judge Traynor nevertheless care-
fully considered in which role California had an interest to choose its
own law. He finally expressed this view:
We think that disabilities to sue and immunities from suit
because of a family relationship are more properly determined
by reference to the law of the state of the family domicile. That
state has the primary responsibility for establishing and regulat-
ing the incidents of the family relationship and it is the only
state inwhich the parties can, by participation in the legislative
processes, effect a change in those incidents. Moreover, it is
undesirable that the rights, duties, disabilities, and immunities
conferred or imposed by the family relationship should constantly
change as members of the family cross state boundaries during
temporary absences from their home. Since all of the parties to
the present case are apparently domiciliaries of California, we
must look to the law of this state to determine whether any dis-
abilities or immunities exist.
The court thus found for the plaintiff by applying the law of the
domicile rather than that of the place-of-wrong. American courts had
previously invoked local immunity rules negatively on the ground of
public policy to defeat out-of-state claims between family members.
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We find only one American case, however-and that one decided only
one year before-where the court of domicile indicated casually that it
would allow recovery under local law against a resident, who would
have been immune under the law of the place-of-wrong. 4
The Emery decision has been followed by the Wisconsin and New
Jersey courts 5 and has been rejected-on stare decisis principles-by
the courts of Minnesota, Connecticut and Missouri. 36 The Wisconsin
decisions, in particular, merit discussion.
3 Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N.Y. 466, 3 N.E. 2d 597 (1936) ; Kircher v. Kircher, 288
Mich. 669, 286 N.W. 120 (1939); Kyle v. Kyle, 210 Minn. 204, 297 N.W. 744
(1941).
u4Johnson v. Peoples First National Bank and Trust Co., 394 Pa. 116, 145 A.
2d 716, 717, n. 1 (1954).
3 Haumschild v. Continental Casualty Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W. 2d 814 (1959);
Bodenhagen v. Farmers Mutual Insurance Co., Inc., 5 Wis. 2d 306, 92 N.W.
2d 759 (1958), 95 N.W. 2d 822 (1959); Koplik v. C. P. Trucking Corp., 27
N.J. 1, 141 A. 2d 34 (1958). See also Morin v. Le Tourneau, 102 N.H. 309,
156 A. 2d 131 (1959).
36 Allen v. Nessler, 247 Minn. 230, 76 N.W. 2d 793, 799 (1956); Bissonnette v.
Bissonnette, 145 Conn. 733, 142 A. 2d 527 (1957); Robinson v. Gaines, 331
S.W. 2d 653 (Mo. 1960).
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Before 1959 the orthodox rule seemed well established in Wisconsin
that the law of the place-of-wrong governed intra-family liability and
immunity.3 7 In 1957 a Wisconsin wife sued her husband (and his
insurer) in Wisconsin for injuries suffered in an Illinois auto accident.
Wisconsin law would permit her to sue her husband for damages while
Illinois law at that time would not. The Wisconsin court initially pur-
ported to follow the orthodox doctrine by applying Illinois law. It
nevertheless permitted the wife to recover against her husband on the
unsupportable view that the Illinois legislature had intended its statute
as remedial-barring such suits in Illinois courts but not precluding the
creation of rights in Illinois which the wife could enforce in courts out-
side the state. s On reargument five months later the same court implied
that its previous construction of the Illinois law was erroneous.3 9 The
court adhered to its decision, however, this time on the better reasoned
rule of the Emery case, namely that intra-family liability or immunity
is governed by the law of the family domicile and not of the place-of-
wrong. The court refashioned its rationale the more readily because in
the meanwhile it had heard the arguments on appeal of the Haumschild
case. In fact the court decided the Bodenhagen case on reargument on
the same day on which it had decided the Haumschild case.
In Haumschild a Wisconsin wife (at least de facto) sued her hus-
band and his insurer in Wisconsin for injuries suffered in a California
auto accident. California law at the time recognized no intra-spousal
tort liability whereas Wisconsin law, of course, provided for such lia-
bility. On appeal the attorneys for plaintiff-appellant seem to have
conceded the applicability of the law of California-the place-of-wrong.
However, they seized on the Emery rule to argue that since California
would refer the question to Wisconsin, the law of domicile, the Wis-
consin court should accept the referral on principles of renvoi and
should decide the case in the same way as the California court-in
accordance with Wisconsin domestic law. The Wisconsin court refused
to accept the renvoi doctrine on the assumption, rightly or wrongly,
that it was contrary to prevailing American law. The court, however,
was so beguiled by the rationality of the California choice of law that
it adopted that choice as its own. It thus determined the question of
intra-family liability by applying its own law as the law of domicile.
So doing, it overruled six Wisconsin decisions in conflict, handed down
from 1931 to 1956.
Reasons are obvious why the domicile has a greater interest than the
casual place-of-wrong in regulating the jural relations between members
3 See discussion of cases: Haumschild v. Continental Casualty Co., see supra note
35, at 818-19.
3s Bodenhagen v. Farmers Mutual Ins. Co., 5 Wis. 2d 400, 92 N.W. 2d 759 (1959).
39 Id. 5 Wis. 2d 306, 95 N.W. 2d 822 (1959).
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of a family.40 The insurance element involved in many such cases, and
in practically all auto injury cases, provided another powerful induce-
ment toward adoption of the domiciliary rule.41 Public policy strongly
favors the carriage of casualty insurance by owners and drivers of
motor cars. When a family head buys such insurance the scope of cov-
erage he seeks would normally extend to all risks imposed by the law
of his domicile as well as by the law of any foreign state in which he
might happen to be traveling at the time of an accident. A man domi-
ciled in a liability state-namely a state whose law would render him
liable for injuries to his wife or child or to a guest passenger-would
be insuring against greater expected risks and presumably would be
required to pay a commensurately higher premium, than a similar man
domiciled in an immunity state. Where he has purchased and paid for
insurance to protect his family and his guests, why should he be denied
such protection because of the fortuitous circumstance that he was
driving across an immunity state at the particular time of an accident.
The insurer issued its policy in contemplation, principally, of risks im-
posed by the law of insured's domicile. True, it also must undertake
any additional risks imposed by any other state where injury may occur
and which is covered by the policy, but at the time of contracting the
insurer can be expected to fix premium charges to cover all contem-
plated risks. It suffers no injustice. On the contrary strict application
of the orthodox place-of-wrong rule affords insurers the prospect of
windfall profits whenever it would enable them to escape liability on
risks which they have undertaken and for which they have been paid
premiums.4 2
(c) Admonitory Laws
"Admonitory" is the descriptive term sometimes applied to laws
which impose specified risks and liabilities, without regard to fault or
negligence, on persons engaged in particular enterprises subject to reg-
ulation. So the Connecticut statute involved in Levy v. Daniels' U-Drive
Auto Renting Co., Inc. 43 imposed vicarious liability on entrepreneurs
renting out autos; also Dram Shop Acts commonly impose vicarious
liability on dram shop keepers for torts of intoxicated persons to whom
they (the keepers) have sold or given liquor which caused the intoxica-
tion . Such legislation has a twofold purpose: first, to police particular
activities within the state and induce greater care in their operation by
imposing extraordinary sanctions and, second, to provide some assur-
40 Cf. Wyzanski and Traynor quoted above, supra notes 23 and 32.
41 Supra note 22.
42 Ehrenzweig, Guest Statutes in the Conflict of Laws: Towards a Theory of
Enterprise Liability under "Foreseeable and Insurable Laws," 69 YALE L. J.
595, 599, 603 (1960) ; R. P. Cook, What Law Governs Intra-fanily Liability.,
27 IN s. COUNSEL J. 143 (1960).
43 Supra note 18.
[Vol. 45
CONFLICTS
ance for collection of adequate damages by tort victims of irresponsible
auto bailees or drunks. Since traditionally we tend to circumscribe
jurisdiction by territorial metes and bounds we note that admonitory
laws have two territorial impacts, one at the place where the business
is operated and the other at the place where the tort occurs. Since oc-
currence of the tort is prerequisite to liability of the entrepreneur,
courts bound to the place-of-wrong dogma have been reluctant to apply
sanctions under such laws except where the place-of-wrong as well as
the place of business both happen to be within the law-making state.
Such courts have disregarded the fact that a state's interest in policing
an enterprise operated within its borders may be quite independent of
whether ill effects occur within or without the state.
The Connecticut court in the Levy case seems to have sensed the
narrowness of view reflected by any regulation of a local business
which withholds its sanctions when connected with accidents outside the
state-like a parent who punishes his child for trampling the flowers in
his own garden but tolerates like conduct in the yards of his neighbors.
But back in 1928 the Connecticut court, as we have seen, had difficulty
disentangling itself from the place-of-wrong dogma and had to devise
its own far fetched contract theory which allowed the tort victim to
recover in the alleged status of a third party beneficiary.
Two Illinois cases and one Minnesota case provide the leading deci-
sions on Dram Shop Acts. 44 The Illinois court held that the Illinois
Dram Shop Act showed no legislative intent to impose liability on dram
shop keepers with respect to their customer's torts committed outside
the state. The Minnesota court construed its Dram Shop Act to the
contrary. As must be clear by now, this writer prefers the approach of
the Minnesota court. In justification of the Illinois court, however, it
should be noted that the Illinois Act is a harsh law since it imposes lia-
bility on anyone who shall have caused the intoxication of the tort-
feasor "in whole or in part". Thus if the tort-feasor started out stone
sober and made the round of a dozen bars, the first bar keeper who
sold him his first bottle of beer is equally liable under the law with the
last one who sold him his last zombie. The court, emphasizing this
penal character, held the Act must be strictly construed; absent explicit
expression of legislative intent, the Act did not apply to out-of-state
torts. The court nevertheless recognized the legislature's jurisdiction to
impose such liability if it saw fit.
More subtle questions of jurisdiction are raised if we consider the
possibility of a Minnesota court applying the Minnesota Dram Shop
Act to an out-of-state dram shop keeper whose intoxicated cus-
44 Eldredge v. Don the Beachcomber, Inc., 342 Ill. App. 151, 95 N.E. 2d 512
(1950); Butler v. Wittland, 18 Ill. App. 2d 578, 153 N.E. 2d 106 (1958);
Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, Inc., 249 Minn. 376, 82 N.W. 2d 365 (1957).
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tomer commits a tort in Minnesota. Minnesota would possess recog-
nized jurisdiction over the tort aspects of the event but on no tra-
ditional basis would it have jurisdiction to police or regulate the
out-of-state keeper. The question arises whether its tort jurisdiction
should extend to the imposition of liability on non-residents who
were at no time present in or subject to the state and whose imputed
liability is not based on fault, negligence, agency, ownership of
property within the state or any other common law ground. Learned
Hand would presumably answer the question in the negative.45 But
suppose the out-of-state keeper was located in Illinois and his in-
toxicated customer had committed his tort in Minnesota. Here
where both states have statutes so similar in content and purpose
it would seem strangely uncooperative to deny relief under the
Minnesota law because the dram shop keeper operated in Illinois
and to deny relief under the Illinois law because the customer's tort
occurred in Minnesota.
Two recent cases have dealt with the problem and both have
reached good results: Osborn v. Borchetta6 and Waynick v. Chicago's
Last Department Store.47 In the Osborn case the Connecticut court
held that the New York Dram Shop Act gave rise to a Connecticut
cause of action where the liquor sale and intoxication occurred in
New Yorkt and the subsequent accident occurred in Connecticut.
A New York court had previously construed the Act (or its predeces-
sor) back in 188448 as not imposing liability on a New York dram
shop keeper for a customer tort in Vermont, although the court there
implied it might have decided differently under the New York Act
if Vermont had had a similar statute. This implication prompted
one "place-of-wrong" theorist to suggest it would be more correct
to suppose that the suit must be brought under the statute
of the jurisdiction where the injury occurred (Vermont) and
that the existence of a similar statute in the jurisdiction of
the forum (New York) would make the action maintainable
there.49
In this regard the rationale of the Osborn case is not as clear as
it might be although we like the result reached. After reviewing
the remedial as well as penal aspects of the New York Dram Shop
Act the Connecticut court concluded that the obligations arising
under it will be enforced in Connecticut. It dismisses the New York
court's early holding that the Act had no extra-territorial effect
with the statement that such holding "did not involve the rules of
45 See supra notes 11, 14 and 24.
46 20 Conn. Supp. 163, 129 A. 2d 238 (1956).
47 269 F. 2d 322 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 903 (1960).49 Goodwin v. Young, 34 Hun. 252 (N.Y. 1884).
4 9 Annot., 22 A.L.R. 2d 1128, 1129 (1952).
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conflict of laws and is not applicable to the present case." Now if
the Connecticut court's action was really limited to enforcement of
the New York Act, as the court purported, no pronouncement would
be more directly applicable to the case than the New York court's
judicial interpretation of its own Act. Actually, however, though
perhaps unconsciously, the court was making and applying its own
law in the case, by extending the purely domestic effect of the New
York Act to the territory of Connecticut. Exercising its common
law judicial authority to make law when necessary, it bridged the
gap between the localized application of the respective statutes of
New York and Connecticut. It was willing to do so because "the dis-
similarities between the Dram Shop Act of New York and that in
our own state was not sufficient to constitute an enforcement of
rights under the former a contravention of our public policy."
The Waynick case presents somewhat the same situation with
notable variations. Illinois was the place where defendant operated
a dram shop and sold liquor to an intoxicated customer while the
customer's tort was committed in Michigan. The Federal court in
Illinois was the forum and we would ordinarily have expected the
court to follow in the path blazed by the Illinois decisions in
Eldredge and Butler.50 In diversity cases Erie Railroad Co. v. Tomp-
kins5' is said to have relegated Federal courts to the role of a "ven-
triloquist's dummy" but here the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
has spoken boldly with no prompting from state court precedents.
The plaintiffs rested their claims on the alternative bases of (1)
the Illinois Dram Shop Act, (2) the equivalent Michigan Act, or
(3) the common law. The Court of Appeals rejected the first two
bases on the ground that the Illinois decisions precluded application
of the Illinois Act to extra-territorial torts and a Michigan decision
precluded application of its Act to an extra-territorial sale of liquor.
The court nevertheless granted recovery on the basis of Michigan
common law.
The court was concerned with the "vacuum" left by the local-
ized application of the Dram Shop Acts of the two states and the
injustice of leaving the plaintiffs without redress "for death and
injuries sustained in what was evidently an appalling automobile
accident." By Illinois law-at least in its domestic aspects-there
would have been no recovery. The court therefore turned to the
common law of Michigan, stressing, however, a penal section of the
Illinois Code (not the Dram Shop Act) which provides punishment
for anyone selling or giving liquor to an intoxicated person. The
court relied on this statute to demonstrate that enforcement of the
50 Supra note 44.
51304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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Michigan common law right of action would in no way offend the
interest or public policy of Illinois. The court in effect recognized
the concurrent jurisdictions of Michigan and Illinois. Michigan had
exercised its jurisdiction affirmatively by granting a right of recov-
ery while Illinois actions, in the court's view, constituted a non-
exercise. Illinois law failed to grant any affirmative right of recovery
under domestic law but it did not bar recovery under the law of any
other state with legitimate jurisdiction. Accordingly the way was
open for an Illinois court to adopt a rule of conflict of laws per-
mitting it to enforce the Michigan common law right of action.
Absent Illinois precedents the Federal Court of Appeals, sitting as
an Illinois court, originated and applied such a rule to reach a just
result in the case. When the time comes we hope the state courts
will follow the same course.5 1 a
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Under the theory of multiple legislative jurisdiction either or
any one of the jurisdictions in the circumstances of each of the cases
which we have discussed, could be regarded as having a legitimate in-
terest in the transaction to grant relief under its own domestic law or its
law of conflicts. This might be subject to a caveat where the laws of
two jurisdictions actually clash; for example, if Illinois affirmatively
protected its dram shop keepers from liability for their customers'
torts, any attempt by Michigan to impose liability on the Illinois
keeper might well exceed the bounds of due process. Since the Illi-
nois keeper was never present in Michigan and his connection with
Michigan events was altogether too tenuous and remote to support
any common law principle of liability, we believe Michigan's sword
would then be ineffectual against the Illinois shield.
In a trial of any case involving multiple jurisdictions-each hav-
ing substantial contacts with the transaction-a neutral forum in
most circumstances might well think it sensible to apply the do-
mestic law of the jurisdiction which is most favorable to the plain-
tiff. The plaintiff usually might achieve such result by selecting as his
forum that jurisdiction which could be expected to be most favor-
able to his claim. It would be quite legitimate for him to do so.
It is clear our argument has carried us beyond the point to
which most of the courts have gone in their departure from the
orthodox place-of-wrong doctrine. Thus even Judge Traynor in the
Emery case 52 continued to look to Idaho, the place-of-wrong, to
determine defendant's liability to a guest rider. Yet the considera-
51a Since this article was written the Illinois Supreme Court decided Cunningham
v. Brown, - Ill. -, 178 N.E. 2d 153 (1961), indicating probable disagreement
with the Waynick case.
52 Supra note 32.
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tions which favor application of domiciliary law to determine a
man's liability to his wife and child, would seem to favor to only a
slightly less degree, the application of the same law to his liability
toward the next-door neighbor who rides with him. A state has a
legitimate concern in the jural interrelations of any two of their
citizens whether or not they are members of the same immediate
family. This concern is in fact the basic justification for the decision
in Grant v. McAuliffe.53 It is therefore almost with a sense of shock
that we come upon a 1958 decision by a California District Court
of Appeals which scarcely reflects the enlightened views of the
California Supreme Court expressed in the Grant and Emery cases.
Victor v. Sperryr involved a suit by a plaintiff injured in a col-
lision with a car driven by defendant Sperry. All persons were resi-
dents of California but the accident occurred in Mexico. The Cali-
fornia court found the plaintiff had suffered actual damages in ex-
cess of $40,000 but on appeal reduced judgment to $6,000 by apply-
ing the Mexican measure of damages which, in turn, reflected the
comparatively low economic standards of that country. The Mexi-
can formula prescribed 70% of $2 for each day of disability (subject
to variations on the basis of such personal factors as age, etc.) plus
certain addenda for so-called "moral damage." In this case both
parties lived in California, subject to its laws and affected by its
economic standards. Although Mexico was the fortuitous place-of-
wrong California was the realistic place of injury since it was there
that plaintiff endured his continuing injuries and economic losses.
The court's exclusive emphasis on the place-of-wrong is an anachron-
ism associated with the historical view of torts as a branch of
criminal law. This view fuses or confuses the concept of tort with
criminal liability which, of course, looks to the territorial law gov-
erning the act. It gives too little consideration to the compensatory
element of tort law with which the place-of-wrong often has but
minor and remote contact. If an American traveling in Mexico were
injured by a Mexican we would not try to impose American stand-
ards of compensation on the Mexican; likewise if the American in-
jured a Mexican while in Mexico we would compensate the Mexican
by standards of Mexico. But the Victor decision was quite different
since both parties were residents of California and the Mexican
contact with the case was fortuitous and ephemeral. The decision
harks back to the deplorable result reached in Slater v. Mexican
National Railway discussed earlier in this paper.55
Today a court disposed to accept the reality of concurrent juris-
5 Supra note 27.
54 Victor v. Sperry, 329 P. 2d 728 (Dist. Ct. App., 4th Dist. of Cal., 1958).
55 Supra note 10.
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diction as illustrated in the cases discussed would presumably decide
differently both the Slater and the Scheer"6 cases. It would recognize
the absurdity of a decision frustrating the policies manifest in the
laws both of the foreign and the local jurisdiction, on the logical
premise that it was restricted by the precise form of remedy pre-
scribed by the Mexican jurisdiction, in the one instance, and in the
latter case by the limitation on Ontario's jurisdiction over the New
York defendant.
LOVELACE V. WOLF REVISITED
Suppose we now re-examine our hypothetical case of Lucy v.
Walter as affected by the recognition of concurrent jurisdiction.
New York's interest in abolishing the civil remedy for seduction
was to eliminate litigation as an instrument of blackmail, shake-
down and fraud. Its interest would seem to be paramount only with
respect to litigation in its own courts. State X also has substantial
contacts with Lucy's case. It was and is the residence of both parties.
It would have been the likely place of fulfillment of the promise or
expectation of marriage which was an element in the seduction.
There Lucy would face most of the social consequences of her ber-
trayal-possibly some trauma of conscience or loss of reputation,
and even the mockery and sly boasts of Walter. All this would
amount to continuing social damage to a resident-citizen of State X
which would justify that State's reasonable concern. Since the dam-
age was caused directly by the wrongful and intentional act of an-
other resident-citizen, it would not seem unreasonable for State X
to extend to the case its own seduction remedies. If it did so it would
not affront the sovereign power of New York by imposing sanc-
tions against New York activities in view of the fact that New York
would have no interest in protecting such activities and in fact it-
self penalized them.
The State X judges could easily dismiss Lucy's complaint on the
authority of the traditional American place-of-wrong rule. If, how-
ever, they recognized the concept of concurrent jurisdiction, the
effect of that concept on the seduction case would probably depend
on their personal preferences between the local and the New York
law, and possibly on their insights into the respective worthiness
of the two particular persons before them, Lucy and Walter. In any
event the recognition of concurrent jurisdiction would permit them
far greater latitude than the old place-of-wrong theory in their effort
to achieve a just result.
56 Supra note 11.
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